The so-called “3.11 (March 11, 2011),” or the Great East Japan Earthquake and the accompanying Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant accident, have had a profound impact, not only on the daily lives of the Japanese people, but also on the future of this country. The aftermath will not be easily forgotten, and we should take this opportunity to reconsider the way Japan ought to be in future and the way of life of the Japanese people. From this standpoint, I would like to discuss risk and crisis management and science and technology-related activities below.

Risk and crisis management

“Risk and crisis management” is not confined to the scope of conventional “risk management” or “crisis management,” and treats risk and crisis in a comprehensive and systematic manner. That is, risk and crisis management considers both risk, which is a potential factor of crisis, and crisis, which represents a situation of considerable difficulty, and manages these two factors in a comprehensive manner. It is a systematic activity which, in some instances, takes risks without hesitation and acts in a proactive manner, while in other instances, intends to reduce the unnecessary burden of risks and, in moments of crisis, tries to minimize the damage as much as possible.

In any risk and crisis management, it is important to have a perspective of human science, as it is considerably influenced by the nature and attitude of those who are engaged in the actual management. Additionally, a social science viewpoint is also required, because team play is the basic principle in this activity, and frequently, the damage caused by a crisis extends not only to individuals, but also to communities and the whole society. Further, it also has an aspect of natural science, in the sense that natural science and engineering knowledge is indispensable to the activity itself and the analysis. Namely, studies on “risk and crisis management” need systematization which integrates the three realms of science.

However, considering these properties of risk and crisis management, we could expect to face some difficulty when attempting to introduce it into the current compartmentalized academic structure, which focuses on an analytical approach. On the other hand, the above-mentioned risk and crisis management activity is what human beings have actually been engaged in throughout the course of recorded human history, and all individuals have been involved in such activities many times, either unconsciously, or as a part of other business, for as long as they can remember. This experience acts as a type of psychological resistance to consciously managing risks and crises.

In addition to the 3.11 earthquake and tsunami, we are surrounded by various other risks, and in many cases these have developed into crises including food poisoning, new types of influenza, a variety of accidents, and the Euro Crisis triggered by the Lehman Shock and the recent Greek debt crunch. The recent extensive flooding in Thailand and the great loss it caused to Japanese companies should also be noted. Each inconvenient situation or crisis, however, is addressed on a case-by-case basis, and is finally ‘settled’ by means of partially optimum response measures, implemented in collaboration with experts in each realm of specialization, from the viewpoint of the respective realm. Consequently, even when potential or latent problems are prevalent due to errors in integration as a whole, they are often overlooked.

If partial optimization is difficult, problems are determined to have no optimum solution, and are brought to the so-called political or policy table. In many cases, as political or policy judgments are focused on easing the pain of each moment as much as possible, they often lead to the shelving of problems and the implementation of stopgap measures. As a result, words like “unexpected” and “once every several hundred years” are used, as if to suggest they are inevitable.

Risk and crisis management (regulation) in science and technology-related activities

Science and technology-related activities can be considered to be composed of (1) the generation of science and technology-related knowledge, including research and development activities, (2) the utilization of this knowledge for the good of human beings and society, (3) the promotion/diffusion and succession of explicit and tacit science and technology knowledge, (4) measures to prevent the activities mentioned in the preceding 3 items from harming human beings or society or from leaving a harmful legacy, and (5) the management to allow these activities to be conducted properly.

The drafting of manuals, including various types of safety standards, as well as training and workshops, are conducted for the purpose of managing the risks inherent in research and development activities, etc. and the crises stemming from these risks. As for the utilization of science and technology knowledge, safety regulation is conducted for high-temperature/voltage facilities, nuclear facilities, buildings, electrical products, automobiles, railroads, air navigation, pharmaceutical products, domestic chemicals and food products, as well as for workers. Additionally, for the purpose of preventing science and technology-related activities from harming human beings or society or from leaving a harmful legacy, safety reviews are conducted, and safety conditions have been set up to minimize the risks of newly developed chemical substances to humans and the environment, as well as the risks connected to genetically-engineered organisms.

These regulatory frameworks are partially optimized according to conventional practices based on the history, or to the preferences in each area. When it comes to the management of trans-disciplinary risks across the entire science and technology area, the emphasis is often on the morality of scientists and engineers.

However, at present, these methods of managing the risks and crises related to science and technology appear to be facing critical limits.

After all, if it is left to self-imposed regulation, the management of these risks and crises will be dependent on the ethical attitudes of each of the parties concerned.

The official regulations carried out by government offices tend to attach primary importance to formal requirements. The scale and resources of the staff and divisions in charge of the regulatory activities are far smaller than those found in other countries, and the system falls far short of being able to allow for any substantial regulation. The regulatory officers inevitably have shallower, albeit across a broader area, knowledge and experience than the regulated, due to their limited experience in actual business activities, etc. In addition, under the personnel assignment system in government offices, frequent personnel reshuffles are made, meaning regulatory officers have limited opportunities to obtain expertise.

Further, due to the difference in the remuneration of administrative officials and engineering officials and that of other officials, these experts are always underpaid, and they may only be afforded the status of weak government office staff. Therefore, they often face difficulty in maintaining a high level of motivation. In fact, even when staff members are keen to improve the situation, they are likely to be kept at a distance by the surrounding staff, and are also likely to be shunned by the regulated. Then, after all these difficulties, they are either pushed into isolation or forced to compromise. Meanwhile, on the side of the regulated, it may be mere human nature to pay more attention to the risks indicated by the regulatory offices than the risks of science and technology themselves.

Furthermore, as will be described in the following section, public regulation is often unable to keep abreast of diversification in the development and utilization of science and technology results.

Therefore, it may be very difficult to considerably reduce risks by means of regulatory methods alone.

Risk and crisis management in science and technology-related activities (Utilization of risk and crisis management methods)

Firstly, human beings have weaknesses such as the fact that they make mistakes, are under the constraint of psychological biases, and are susceptible to prejudices and the surrounding environment. These influences may, in turn, give rise to crises when science and technology expertise is to be utilized. On the other hand, the development of science and technology has made the systems using it more complicated and advanced. Ways of using the results of science and technology development have been changing on a daily basis, and they may often be used by unexpected people in unexpected ways on unexpected occasions. Moreover, there are movements to take advantage of the results of science and technology development for the purpose of increasing profits, extending influence, or intimidating others. All of these are factors in generating risks related to science and technology. Due to the increasing dependence of society on science and technology, these risks have at times developed into crises, and the magnitude of the damage they have caused is far greater than before, sometimes on an outrageous scale.

Meanwhile, in many cases, the changes in social systems and people’s perception haven’t caught up with the progress in the use of science and technology, leaving human beings and society faced with huge risks. The vulnerability of society to cyber-attacks, the possibility of blackouts due to the shutdown of the power supply system, and terrorist attacks using NBCR (Nuclear, Biological, Chemical and Radiological) weapons are some examples. Smaller-scale crises may include phone fraud and the collapse of supply chains due to disasters, etc. The Great East Japan Earthquake on 3.11 and the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant accident are among the unfortunate cases where these risks were left as they were. These issues will be discussed later.

As mentioned above, it is difficult to address the risks accompanying science and technology by means of countermeasures on the basis of the conventional compartmentalized regulatory systems, and it may require more than an emphasis on the moral attitudes of researchers and engineers. As science and technology-related activities and the management of risks and crises are the acts of human beings, and people are usually placed under extreme conditions at times of crisis, it is also necessary to give consideration to the vulnerability of humans and the peculiarities of the organizations and society which are made up of such humans. Further, as any risk management measure will leave some parts unmanaged, and at times, some risks will need to be addressed proactively, it is necessary to take not only risk management measures, but also measures to address the crises stemming from these risks.

Based on the above considerations, it is necessary to utilize the risk and crisis management approach only after taking the required measures, when applying it to science and technology-related activities, and especially when applying science and technology expertise to humans and society.

“3.11” as seen from the viewpoint of risk and crisis management

Science and technology are closely linked to the outcomes of the March 11 Great East Japan Earthquake and the following Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant accident. I will discuss the effects of risk and crisis management using these examples.

The Great East Japan Earthquake and the accompanying tsunami were far bigger than the majority of seismologists had predicted. However, various countermeasures had been taken on the basis of the seismologists’ predictions. Tsunami bulwarks were constructed and the safety of the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant was confirmed in accordance with their predictions. The seismologists’ theories, however, had been obtained using past data, namely old documents and the geological surveys based on them, and were very different from those which had been verified through repeated experiments, but the difference was not taken into consideration. If the risks had been identified and analyzed in a systematic and accurate manner, based on the concept of risk and crisis management, different outcomes could have been expected.

As for the tsunami breakwaters, because the risk to the operators was not fully taken into account when closing the lock gates, the lives of many of the fire fighters who went to the breakwaters to close the lock gates were lost. Additionally, it is suspected that the existence of the bulwarks themselves might have caused harm once they were burst through. Some of the bulwarks’ foundations were damaged, and some of them even collapsed. On another front, supporters of the bulwarks argue that they might have delayed the tsunami coming ashore and diminished its force. Considering the fact that the bulwarks were constructed at great expense and the local residents depended almost solely on them as the primary foothold for protection against tsunami, it seems to have been necessary to take responses from a risk and crisis management perspective, including the analysis of limitations and the preparation of the second and third best measures to be taken in times of crisis.

As for the tsunami issue in the case of the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant, it stands to reason that, when the bulwarks were constructed, the designers thought that seven meter-high bulwarks would be sufficient to protect people because they hadn’t experienced the great earthquakes of the Jogan period, etc. However, they didn’t adhere to the basics of risk and crisis management, i.e. monitoring risks on a steady basis, reconsidering the risks based on new findings, and taking necessary measures, thus leaving themselves vulnerable to tsunami.

The headquarters’ function should have given priority to the back-up responses at the forefront of the field, based on the concept of risk and crisis management, in the initial response stage, and the second and third best measures should have been prepared for implementation when the station blackout occurred, after making assumptions about future scenarios and making a list of requisite operations based on such assumptions, etc., but at the time of writing, there is nothing to suggest that these responses were taken in a systematic manner. Furthermore, if staff knowledge and manpower were not sufficient, there should have been a full mobilization of not only staff from TEPCO (Tokyo Electric Power Company, Incorporated), but also of nuclear officials from electric companies, as well as current/former staff of manufacturers, government offices and research institutes. By joining forces, they might have been able to foresee the possibility of meltdown and hydrogen explosions, as well as to come up with strategies to prevent their occurrence, utilizing the expertise of people with first-hand experience from the Three Mile Island Accident.

Conclusion

The risks associated with the use of knowledge related to science and technology are greater and often more pervasive than the people concerned may think, and, in many cases, cannot be addressed by a limited number of experts alone. In particular, when a crisis arises, risks may often have already been expanded beyond the imagination of experts. Experts including scientists and engineers need to address risks and crises in an especially humble way.

What is more important, however, is the recognition and sense of risks, crises, and risk and crisis management on the part of the executive officers, especially those in top management positions, of organizations including the government. Modern society cannot exist without science and technology. Considering the fact that the risks associated with science and technology have characteristics such as those mentioned above, it is necessary to raise a strong awareness of the risks involved with science and technology, and to learn about the concept/basics, as well as the general outline, of risk and crisis management as a basic element of management, and to utilize it in ordinary organizational management. When faced with a crisis, we are required to make judgments and take the necessary measures to the best of our ability, with a strong sense of leadership and responsibility, regardless of whether we have a humanities or science background. If you find that you have no such capability, you must immediately relegate all authority to those who do. Further, the personnel system should allow only those with such capability to fill the top positions in the first place, and, in the selection of organizational management staff, risk and crisis management ability should be the most heavily-weighted evaluation factor.

I sincerely hope that this document is useful in helping those involved in science and technology to understand risks and crises better, and for mitigating the possibility of crises and the damage caused by crises such as the one which took place on 3.11.

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